- Wanna Decrypter 2.0 ransomware attack: what you need to know
Those contagions – ancient malware by today’s standards – spread through exposed Microsoft vulnerabilities. WannaCry spread the same way. In each case, Microsoft had already released a patch for the security holes.
And so for some, an important lesson continues to go unrecognized: that organizations must keep a close watch for patch updates and deploy the fixes immediately.
WannaCry – also known as Wanna Decrypter 2.0, WCry, WanaCrypt and WanaCrypt0r – exploited a Windows vulnerability that Microsoft released a patch for in March. That flaw was in the Windows Server Message Block (SMB) service, which Windows computers use to share files and printers across local networks. Microsoft addressed the issue in its MS17-010 bulletin.
It hit organizations across the globe, including National Health Service hospitals (NHS) in the UK. Analysis seems to confirm that the attack was launched using NSA code leaked by a group of hackers known as the Shadow Brokers.
It’s likely that some were infected because they hadn’t gotten around to applying the MS17-010 patch. But others suffered because they were running older, unsupported Windows versions and, as a result, never received that security update. For that reason, Microsoft took the highly unusual step of making a security update for platforms in custom support (such as Windows XP) available to everyone. The software giant said in a statement:
We know some of our customers are running versions of Windows that no longer receive mainstream support. That means those customers will not have received the Security Update released in March. Given the potential impact to customers and their businesses, we made the decision to make the Security Update for platforms in custom support only, Windows XP, Windows 8, and Windows Server 2003, broadly available for download here.
Conficker is a widespread network worm that began to spread to millions of unpatched PCs in 2008. The first samples detected at the virus testing service Virus Total were spotted in SophosLabs on November 21 2008. It spread by exploiting a buffer overflow vulnerability in the Windows Server service. That flaw was patched by Microsoft on October 23, 2008 — 29 days before Conficker began its assault.
Slammer began its attack in early 2003, exploiting a vulnerability in Microsoft’s SQL Server database software that had been patched six months earlier. Many of the affected computers were corporate SQL servers, which allowed the worm to quickly acquire a lot of CPU juice and network connectivity. So when this headline appeared, it was no exaggeration at that point in time:
Indeed, there were some unique aspects to the WannaCry attack. Typical ransomware infections happen after the victim clicks on a malicious email attachment or link. In this attack the malware was able to exploit a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability that allowed it to infect unpatched machines without users having to do anything. The attacker’s use of the leaked NSA code likely had something to do with that, though there’s still a lot to learn about this event.
Why some don’t ‘patch now!’
Regardless of those details, the fact remains that this was made all the worse because available patches were never applied.
Some will criticize organizations that are slow to patch or use the latest Windows versions. It can be especially easy to blame the victim. But slow patching or the use of outdated versions of Windows isn’t always the result of laziness or apathy.
It’s long been the case that IT shops hold back some patches because they need to tweak their systems for compatibility. Otherwise, they risk deploying a patch that breaks other programs. Meanwhile, some organizations have continued to use old versions of Windows because:
- They lack the financial and human resources to upgrade.
- Their legacy systems simply aren’t yet equipped to work with the likes of, say, Windows 10.
There are other reasons, but those are two big challenges.
But Sophos CTO Joe Levy said there are cases when a patch shouldn’t be viewed as optional, no matter the company’s patching policy – like when the vulnerabilities fall into the category of common-mode failure.
Only monocultures enable internet-scale failure; all other failures are merely local tragedies. For policymakers, the only aspect of monoculture that matters is that monocultures are the sine qua non of mass exploitation. In the language of statistics, this is “common mode failure,” and it is caused by under-appreciated mutual dependence.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines common-mode failure this way:
A common-mode failure results from a single fault (or fault set). Computer systems are vulnerable to common-mode resource failures if they rely on a single source of power, cooling, or I/O. A more insidious source of common-mode failures is a design fault that causes redundant copies of the same software process to fail under identical conditions.
How does this apply to what happened Friday? Levy explained:
When a failure (and its attendant patch) involves the intersection of common components like SMB (which are present on every Windows system) and remote code execution, that’s a combination that should transcend policy.
In other words, in the case of these Windows SMB vulnerabilities, the patch should not be thought of as optional, irrespective of your policy (or non-policy) on patching. The danger of holding the patches back is that attacks like WannaCry have an easier time engulfing the globe.
More defensive measures
The best advice is still for organizations to keep their patching up to date and use current versions of Windows.
A better way may yet emerge. But not today.