Not long ago, independent software developer Tim Perry, creator of the HTTP Toolkit for intercepting and debugging web traffic…
…decided to add proxy support to his product, which, like lots of software these days, is written using
Node.js sofware typically also relies on NPM, the Node package manager, and the NPM registry, a truly enormous repository of open-source Node tools and programming libraries.
The NPM registry runs from basic text formatting to full-on facial recognition, and almost everything in between.
Instead of writing all, of the code in your project yourself, or even most of it, you simply reference the add-on packages you want to use, and NPM will fetch them for you, along with any additional packages that your chosen package needs…
…and all the packages that those packages need, following the
turtles packages all the way down until every piece of add-on code needed to complete the jigsaw has been located and installed automatically.
As you can imagine, this is a potential security nightmare.
Adding just one package to your own project may required a slew of additional packages, each of which may have been written by a different person whom you don’t know, have never met, and probably never will.
This alphabet soup is known as your software’s dependency tree, and we have written about the risky side-effects of this approach to software construction before, noting that:
Proxy support brings trouble
Perry rediscovered this risk recently, when he decided to use a popular NPM package called
Proxy-Agent to provide the proxy support he wanted in his HTTP Toolkit product.
Fortunately, Perry didn’t just blindly fetch, install and start using
Proxy-Agent and its entire dependency tree without doing a review of the newly-acquired components in his project.
Thus he came across a security flaw, now dubbed CVE-2021-23406, in a
Proxy-Agent dependency called
Pac-Resolver, which is a subcomponent that helps your code deal with the process of PAC, or proxy auto-configuration (see sidebar below).
A proxy server is one that makes outgoing connections on your behalf, typically for security (e.g. to filter web traffic), for performance (e.g. to keep local copies of files that get downloaded often, or to regulate bandwidth usage during busy periods), or for both. You connect to the proxy and tell it where you want to go; it makes the onward connection for you, collects the replies, and returns them to you . Many corporate networks are configured so that certain outbound connections, notably HTTP requests, are only possible from a designated proxy server. This ensures that everyone inside the network sends their traffic via the proxy, instead of going directly to external sites. Numerous corporate-style tools exist to help computers on a network locate their official internal proxies automatically, including PAC, short for proxy auto-configuration, and WPAD, short for web proxy auto-discovery.
Believe it or not
PAC files, believe it or not, aren’t just data-only lists of IP numbers or server names where your network’s official proxy servers are located.
Because they were intended to be ingested and used inside your browser, PAC files were deliberately designed to be more flexible than just a static data list.
As Perry notes, the PAC file format dates back a quarter of a century, and first appeared as a “feature” in the Netscape browser:
He discovered that the code used a Node component called
This is a handy precaution if you want to have two parts of your code doing separate things in such a way that they can’t trample on each other by mistake.
In the words of the
vm library documentation:
Safety is good, but security is better
Perry realised that the original programmer, whose code he had now adopted, was using the
vm library as much for programmatic security as for safety, apparently assuming that a new
vm instance was not only separate from other
However, as the
vm documentation makes clear, in loud, boldfaced type:
vmmodule is not a security mechanism. Do not use it to run untrusted code.
vm instance that had full access to the external data of his main
Technically, that constitutes an RCE bug in the proxy configuration process, where RCE is short for remote code execution.
Loosely speaking, RCE means that untrusted content fetched from an untrusted source can deliberately do something treacherous that isn’t supposed to be allowed, without any warnings or popup dialogs showing up first.
Is this really a problem?
…and if you can silently redirect every browser on the network, then surely you already have more than enough cybercriminal control to wreak havoc on the organisation?
Therefore, some commenters argued, CVE-2021-23406 is little more than a storm in a teacup.
Except that redirecting everyone’s browsers via a fake proxy, as risky as this might ultimately be, simply isn’t as dangerous as having the power to run an arbitrary program on every computer on the network as a side-effect of the proxy configuration…
…while leaving the original proxy configuration unchanged, so that everything else still seems to be working as usual
Hacking a network by overtly reconfiguring every computer to start using a different proxy server is much more likely to produce troublesome side-effects that will get noticed, reported and investigated.
Contemporary cybercrooks like to stay “under the radar” by avoiding changes that regular users might notice even if they weren’t being watchful for cybersecurity incidents.
What to do?
- Do you have any Node.js software that uses
Proxy-Agent? If so, ensure you have version 5.0.0 or later of these packages.
- Do you reguarly review the many
Node.jsmodules on which your products rely? If not, make plans to do so. This means factoring the extra time and expertise into your software release process. Move fast and break things might be a usable motto for prototypes and in-house experiments, but it’s a reckless way to build shipping products.
- Do you assume that widely-used packages can be treated as secure? If so, then don’t. CVE-2021-23406 is not the sort of bug that is likely to show up in regular use, unlike a buffer overflow that may reveal itself through unexpected crashes. Some bugs are only found because someone decided to take a careful look, as Tim Perry did here.
For what it’s worth, Perry notes that the packages in this story receive about 3,000,000 downloads a week, so popularity alone is no guarantee of correctness.
Never forget, when it comes to so-called supply chain bugs of this sort, that you can outsource the coding, but you can’t outsource the responsibility.